These examples are representative rather than exhaustive, and the American political tradition is replete with instances of presidents, cabinet officials, members of Congress, and countless less-exalted officials who have relatively shamelessly taken the position that immoral and at times simply unwise laws need not be considered binding. And in doing so these officials have situated themselves within a post-Nuremburg tradition in which "I was just following the law" is hardly more of a defense to morally wrongful official action than "I was just following orders" is.
My goal in this chapter is to use a two-pronged focus to explore these issues. One prong, which is especially timely these days, is to examine just what we mean by "the law" when we say, commonly, that we expect presidents and other high-government officials to obey the law. With increasing frequency, presidents and their allies from a wide variety of political perspectives claim that there is a big difference between what "the law," especially constitutional law, is, and what the courts, especially the Supreme Court, say the law is. While there may be an obligation to obey the Constitution, it is said, there is no presidential (or congressional) obligation to obey what the Supreme Court says the Constitution says. 6 The courts are just one branch of government, so the argument goes, and accepting the obligation (whether from the oath of office or otherwise) to follow the Constitution does not entail an obligation to follow the Supreme Court's understanding of it.
7
So one task is that of attempting to sort out just what it means to follow the law, especially in the context of American constitutional law. But even if we can make sense out of this issue, there remains the other prong of the analysis, the question whether there is, especially on the part of presidents, an obligation to obey the law and an obligation to obey the Constitution. When breaking the law is morally or politically problematic as well, it is easy to chastise those who do the wrong thing for breaking the law as well as being wrong. So although we criticize Richard Nixon and his aides for breaking the law, we would likely criticize them for their various transgressions against democratic governance even were it not illegal to steal documents from one's political opponents or unlawful to deploy the audit power of the Internal Revenue Service in the goal of punishing those who would dare to criticize official authority. But if there really is no obligation on the part of presidents to obey the law just because it is the law, then it is wrong for a president to follow the law when the law commands what is wrong, and it is right for a president to break the law in the service of higher moral or policy goals. An obligation to obey the law has bite when the law commands that which is wrong or prohibits that which is right, and from this perspective it is hardly clear that the obligation to obey the law is an unqualified good.
8 So after examining just what it is to obey the law, with a particular focus on the Constitution, I will turn to the question of whether there is, especially on the part of presidents, an obligation to obey the law at all and to obey that particularly important component of the law that we call the Constitution.
